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Abstract: The article deals with the question 
of right to healthcare as it is set by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the 
Czech Republic and at the same time with the 
question of rationing in healthcare. Rationing 
in healthcare generally means a process reali-
zed by providing different levels of healthcare. 
In the Czech Republic, rationing in healthcare 
is rather based on a limitation of a treatment’s 
payment from public health insurance which, 
however, does not fit the common definitions 
of rationing. By describing and explaining the-
se crucial questions the article discusses the 
possibility to limit the constitutional right to 
healthcare covered by public health insurance 
in the Czech Republic and shows these possibi-
lities which are based on provisions of the Act 
No. 48/1997 Sb., on public health insurance. 
More widely it questions whether the system of 
public health insurance in the Czech Republic 
is sustainable at all.
Keywords: Healthcare. Rationing. Public heal-
th insurance.
Resumo: O artigo trata da questão do direito à 
saúde e de como ele é definido pela Carta dos 
Direitos e Liberdades Fundamentais da Repú-
blica Checa, e ao mesmo tempo da questão do 
racionamento na saúde. Racionamento na saú-
de geralmente significa um processo destinado 
a proporcionar diferentes níveis de cuidados de 
saúde. Na República Checa, o racionamento na 
área da saúde é baseado numa limitação de pa-
gamento de um tratamento pelo seguro públi-
co de saúde que, no entanto, não se harmoniza 
com as definições usuais de racionamento. Ao 
descrever e explicar essas questões cruciais, o 
artigo discute as possibilidades de limitação do 
direito constitucional à saúde coberto por um 
seguro público de saúde na República Checa e 
mostra essas possibilidades baseadas nas dis-
posições da Lei n. 48/1997 Sb. de planos públi-
cos de seguro-saúde. Mais amplamente, ques-
tiona se o sistema público de seguro de saúde 
da República Checa é sustentável.
Palavras-chave: Direito à saúde. Racionamen-
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1Iintroduction
With an increasing quality of healthcare in general, there is the question 
of a possible conflict between the constitutionally protected right to healthcare and 
the sustainability of the insurance system in the Czech Republic which is based on 
public health insurance. Therefore, the article will deal with the concept of rationing 
in healthcare which discusses the possibilities of limitation of healthcare provided 
on the basis of public health insurance.
In its first part the article will describe the basics of the Czech right to heal-
thcare as it is set by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. In its follo-
wing chapters it will then deal with the concept of rationing in healthcare itself. 
There are different approaches to rationing and those approaches will be discussed. 
Also the situation in the Czech Republic will be dealt with. This is important since 
there is a question whether the Czech approach to rationing in healthcare is ra-
tioning at all because it does not fit the common definition of rationing which will 
also be discussed in this article. In the Czech Republic the denial of a payment for a 
treatment from the public health insurance is normally a denial to all patients in a 
similar situation and not only to a particular patient needing the treatment.
The aim of this article is to discuss whether a sustainability of the Czech 
public health insurance system is possible and whether there are legal instruments 
which could lead to a limitation of healthcare covered by public health insurance.
2 Right to Healthcare2
In the Czech Republic, the right to healthcare is considered as one of the 
fundamental human rights and is mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms which forms part of the country’s constitution. It is described in its 
Art. 31. This provision states that everybody has the right to protection of health. Ci-
tizens have also right to gratuitous healthcare and medical devices under conditions 
set by legislation on the basis of public health insurance.3
Right to healthcare is also mentioned in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, specifically in its Art. 12 which recognizes the 
right to the best attainable level of health.
This right is one of the social rights according to the catalogue of human 
rights. It belongs to the so-called second generation of human rights. The Czech 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms also categorizes this right as a social 
right. Because of this, it is only possible to demand the fulfilment of this right within 
2  This Article was written with the Support by Czech Science Foundation Grant P408-12-1316 – Czech Health Law 
in European Context: Structural Analysis and Perspectives.
3  See Art. 31 of the Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Assembly on Declaration of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as Part of the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic No. 2/1993 Sb.
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the scope of the relevant legislation which sets the detailed rules. The Czech Cons-
titutional Court decided that social rights do not have an unconditional character 
and it is possible to claim these rights only within the confines set by legislation. 
However, this legislation must not negate or invalidate these rights and their content 
(CZECH REPUBLIC, 2008; CZECH REPUBLIC, 2010). The Constitutional Court 
also emphasized that the limitation of the right to healthcare is only possible by an 
act of Parliament and not by secondary legislation. 
3 Rationing in Healthcare
Rationing in healthcare might be seen as a process realized by providing 
different levels of healthcare. This process might lead to a refusal of care to a patient, 
although the care could potentially help him (however, provided that such care is not 
indispensable for him). Rationing is used when a healthcare service is provided only 
to some patients, selected on the basis of particular criteria, although it could also 
help other patients (HERRING, 2008, p. 52).4 
The most important question is that of rules for determining the extent of 
healthcare services paid from the public health insurance system. These rules deal 
with a possibility to pay for some method, medicinal product or medical device from 
the public health insurance system. To consider whether there are conditions for 
such payment, costs of a therapy are evaluated in relation to its benefits for a patient. 
This process is called cost-effectiveness analysis.
Cost-effectiveness analysis can be described as a basic instrument for ratio-
ning in healthcare. Financial resources of the healthcare system are always limited 
– that is the basic premise. This limitation means that it is not possible to pay all 
potentially beneficial healthcare for all patients because such healthcare is often 
very expensive. This problem might be partially solved by higher effectiveness of the 
healthcare system or minimization of defensive medicine (BRODY; CASSEL, 2012, 
p. 73). Then better effectiveness of healthcare can be achieved.
Cost-effectiveness analysis can be seen as a tool which helps to find the op-
timal option how to provide healthcare. In this case optimal option means the most 
cost-efficient option which helps to save financial resources which can be used to 
help other patients. However, this tool may not represent a benefit for a particular 
patient.
A very well-known example is the case of Coby Howard from Oregon in the 
United States. Coby was a seven years old patient suffering with leukaemia. For this 
reason, in 1987, he needed bone marrow transplant. Until that time Coby has been 
treated within the scope of the Medicaid programme5 due to the financial situation of 
4  For other definitions of rationing, see e.g. Syrett (2007). 
5  Medicaid programme is a social service which makes health insurance possible for people who need it – e.g. chil-
dren, families with a low income etc. The programme is co-financed by the federal government and the individual 
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his family. The programme allowed him to undergo chemotherapy but this treatment 
was unsuccessful. However, the aim of the Medicaid programme was to help also other 
citizens of Oregon. Because of this aim it was not possible to cover the costs of bone 
marrow transplants from this programme and the programme stopped to cover them 
before Coby’s case turned up. A simple calculation was applied – about 1500 potential 
new patients whose healthcare could be covered by the Medicaid programme were 
simply more than some tens of patients suffering from leukaemia whose healthca-
re had been covered by the Medicaid programme until then. This cost-effectiveness 
analysis caused that Coby did not get this treatment and died. All this despite a huge 
social and media pressure whose consequence was that bone marrow transplant again 
began to be covered by the Medicaid programme.6
Rationing in healthcare is very often confronted with such social and me-
dia pressure. This pressure is also being criticised in connection with the so cal-
led “identifiable” and “statistical” lives. Ubel (2001) states that while stricter rules 
for safety of motor vehicles (airbags, ESP etc.) or for the protection of environment 
protect the so-called “statistical” lives (anonymous people), rules for providing he-
althcare services protect an “identifiable” life of a particular person. He uses the 
example of a fifty-year old woman who needs urgent treatment and states that no-
body would question the cost of such treatment in this case. On the other hand if 
somebody invented an expensive method to reduce the number of victims of traffic 
accidents, then, according to Ubel (2001, p. 35), everybody would question the price 
of this method. Therefore for people, an “identifiable” life is more important than a 
“statistical” life.7 
This example is very much connected with the topic of rationing in health-
care. In such cases the media always inform about “identifiable” lives of particular 
patients who need highly specialized and expensive healthcare. Despite the fact that 
we value health significantly and consider the provision of healthcare a very spe-
cific service, it should not prevent us from rationalization of such services. In this 
connection Ubel (2001, p. 35) states that if the society discusses how much should be 
invested in infrastructure or protection of environment (which should improve the 
life quality) it must also discuss how much should be invested in healthcare.
The cost-effectiveness analysis has a high potential to influence the manner 
how rationing in healthcare would be accepted by the society. Rationing in healthca-
re influences not only the use of the latest medicine and treatments or very expensi-
ve methods as it was in the Coby Howard case. Therefore, a good example could be 
the issue of preventive examinations. How often should there be a preventive exami-
nation of a patient? For example how often should women undergo a mammography 
states of the USA. Often it is being mixed up with the Medicare programme which constitutes health insurance for 
persons older than 65 years.
6  For further information on the Coby Howard case, see e.g. Japnega (1987) or Winslow (1989, p. 14-26). 
7  See also other authors, e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein (1997, p. 235-257) and Schelling (1984). 
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examination in order to prevent breast cancer – once in two or three years, or even 
every year? Here the cost-effectiveness analysis can give us the answer. The costs 
for an annual examination and number of cases where breast cancer was detected 
are compared. That means that the outcome is a number how many cases of breast 
cancer are detected in annual examinations or in examinations performed once in 
two years etc. This outcome results in information what is the cost of further “saved” 
lives by more frequent examinations. If these costs are too high (not enough cost-
-efficient), they are not (or should not be) paid from the available funds.
The problem of healthcare systems and of the human right to healthcare 
is that some of the resources are absolutely limited.8 Therefore some of the authors 
talk about rationing in healthcare only if the resources are really absolutely limited 
(EVANS, 1983, p. 2208-2219). Such resources are for example organs intended for 
donation for transplantation. In this case, a higher quantity of money in the health-
care system does not mean a higher quantity of such organs.
Evans (1983) and other authors state that if the resources are not absolutely 
limited then the term rationing should not be used because then it is only an allocation 
of provided healthcare (UBEL; GOOLD, 1998, p. 209-214). On the one hand, allocation 
of provided healthcare means deciding about the type of the treatment, on the other 
hand rationing means choosing patients who will get a treatment which is limited only 
to a specific number of patients (while others will not get this treatment) (EVANS, 
1983, p. 2208-2219). Many other authors refuse this theory, though. These authors con-
sider allocation as rationing of a higher level (UBEL; GOOLD, 1998, p. 211).
All the above mentioned definitions bring us to further questions concer-
ning the criteria for rationing in healthcare and its possibilities. With regard to the 
above mentioned, two types of explicit rationing will be discussed. These are ra-
tioning by exclusion and rationing by guideline (HAM, 1995, p. 1483). Rationing by 
exclusion is often described also as rationing by denial.9
4 Rationing In The Czech Republic
Rationing in healthcare in the Czech Republic is closely connected with the 
question of public health insurance and the fundamental right to healthcare. If there 
is an acceptable ratio of costs to benefits, then a particular treatment or medicinal 
product becomes part of healthcare paid from the public health insurance. On the 
contrary, if the benefit for the patient is not acceptably proportional to costs (the 
benefit being not only saving patient’s life but also providing better life quality to 
the patient), then payment from the public health insurance is denied to all patients.
8  Here the word resources means not only financial resources but also available personnel or organs for transplan-
tations.
9  Syrett (2007, p. 64) states in this connection that the first type is applied on higher decision making levels whether 
the second type is applied mostly at the level of healthcare services providers.
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In this system in the Czech Republic it is necessary to question whether this 
method is rationing at all because it does not fit the definition of rationing mentio-
ned before. The difference between the definitions of rationing and the described 
method used in the Czech Republic is that in the Czech Republic if payment from 
the public health insurance system is denied to somebody, then it is denied to all 
patients in a similar situation and not only to a particular patient needing the treat-
ment. So is such a method really a process of rationing in healthcare in the Czech 
Republic? Theoretically, in such case the patient might pay for his treatment on his 
own, not getting any reimbursement from the public health insurance system. Is it 
still rationing in healthcare?
Here it is necessary to focus on the two definitions of rationing by exclusion 
and rationing by guideline and their use in the Czech Republic and also their rela-
tionship with the human right to healthcare according to Art. 31 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
Guidelines10 contain only professionally recommended procedures which 
should help doctors to decide about further treatment of a patient. Therefore these 
guidelines are neither primary nor secondary legislation but only recommendations 
of a professional association. These guidelines aim merely to ensure quality of pro-
vided healthcare services and compliance of provided healthcare services with me-
dical knowledge through determination of best practice. However, these guidelines 
constitute a special method of rationing through determining the recommended tre-
atment of particular diseases and determining an effective (and by that also ineffec-
tive) way to treat a disease. This means that their consequence might be exclusion 
of patients from provision of a particular healthcare service whose treatment is not 
considered effective enough in relation to its benefits (SYRETT, 2007, p. 66).
There is an evident difference between rationing by guideline which was 
described above and rationing by exclusion. In case of rationing by guideline it is 
primarily a decision of the doctor whether she will treat the patient in accordance 
with the non-binding guidelines or not. In case of rationing by exclusion it is the 
question of the payment (reimbursement) of a treatment from the health insurance 
system. Rationing by exclusion can be shown on the Coby Howard case and the 
Medicaid programme in Oregon. In that case only some basic core treatments were 
paid from the programme. Treatments which were not contained in the list were not 
paid by the programme. In such case they are inaccessible to all patients unless they 
are able to pay for them themselves (SYRETT, 2007, p. 64).
In this regard, the right to healthcare in the Czech Republic according to 
Art. 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (that is right to payment 
of healthcare from the public health insurance) is often equated to the right to pro-
10  In the Czech Republic there are guidelines of the Czech Medical Association of J. E. Purkyně which is a registered 
association of physicians. For information about this association, see <http://www.cls.cz/dalsi-odborne-projekty>.
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vision of healthcare. Granting or not granting the payment for a treatment means 
creating categories of healthcare which either can or cannot be provided to a patient 
on the basis of funds from the public health insurance. Once a treatment falls among 
those paid from the public health insurance in accordance with Section 13 of the Act 
No. 48/1997 Sb., on public health insurance, then it must be provided to the relevant 
patient. For this process it is important to define whether a treatment will be paid 
from the public health insurance. This happens if the aim of the treatment is to im-
prove or preserve patient’s state of health, if it fits his state of health and the purpose 
of the treatment, if it is safe for the patient and if it is in accordance with the latest 
knowledge of the medical science and there are proofs of its effectiveness regarding 
the purpose of its provision.
However, a participant on the system of public health insurance in the Cze-
ch Republic may also get payment from the public health insurance system in cases 
where such treatment is normally not covered by the public health insurance. That 
is the field of application of Section 16 of the Act No. 48/1997 Sb., on public health in-
surance. This provision of the act prescribes that a health insurance company shall 
also pay for treatment normally not covered from the public system if the following 
conditions are met:
a) provision of such healthcare is the only possibility to treat the patient, 
and
b) there is a previous consent of the health insurance company’s doctor 
(this condition does not apply in case of danger in delay).
Based on the above and contrary to all theoretical definitions of rationing in 
healthcare, in the public health insurance system in the Czech Republic rationing by 
exclusion does not legally apply in this type of cases.
It could be considered that an extraordinary payment according to Section 
16 of the Act No. 48/1997 Sb., on public health insurance, might be granted only in 
case of life-saving treatments. However, that is not really the case. The aim of a treat-
ment normally not covered by the public health insurance can be also preservation 
of patient’s state of health or moderation of his suffering. This aim is based on Sec-
tion 2 Subsection 4 of the Act No. 372/2011 Sb., on healthcare services and conditions 
for their provision, which besides other things, states that provision of healthcare 
includes activities preserving patient’s state of health or moderation of his suffering. 
This provision allows the public health insurance system to cover also the socalled 
palliative care (care with the aim to moderate the patient’s suffering).
Generally, the fundamental right to healthcare in the Czech Republic com-
prises financial covering by the public health insurance of treatment, technically 
speaking, for each medicinal problem. If there is no such treatment already avai-
lable, the patient has the right to get a payment from the public health insurance 
system for a treatment which is normally not covered by this system. In such case 
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a conflict of interests might arise. There might be a treatment which would help 
more patients but for one of them it is the only possible treatment, for the others it 
is a more expensive alternative to their current treatment. Most probably, the first 
patient would get a payment for this expensive treatment; the others would not get 
it. It would create differences in access to healthcare covered by the public health 
insurance.
An example could be a medicinal product which is covered by the public 
health insurance only in case of a specific indication, although it could be used also 
for other indications. For these further indications the medicinal product would be 
more expensive than a different one, but also effective treatment. Only because the-
re is a cheaper and similarly effective medicinal product, the more expensive and 
more effective product is not covered by the public health insurance.
In this connection, there is a debate in the Czech Republic whether (and 
to which extent) it is possible to allow a regulation of the public health insurance 
system through rationing and at the same time not to allow the patient to pay treat-
ments not covered by the health insurance system himself.
According to Section 11 Subsection 1 d) of the Act. No. 48/1997 Sb., on pu-
blic health insurance, the patient has a right to get healthcare services paid by the 
insurance to the extent and under the conditions set by this act. For such services 
the provider is not allowed to require any payment from the patient. The question 
is whether the current legislation allows the patient to demand treatment excee-
ding the conditions for a payment from the public health insurance system. What 
happens if a patient refuses some treatment and wants a more expensive (but also 
more effective) treatment?
This question was decided by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Repu-
blic in its decision No. Pl. ÚS 14/02 from 4th June 2003. In its decision the Constitu-
tional Court stated that the prohibition of a direct payment from the patient applies 
to gratuitous healthcare. However, the legislation does not prohibit payments for 
healthcare provided beyond the gratuitous healthcare. It is possible to get direct 
payments from patients for such healthcare (CZECH REPUBLIC, 2003). From this 
decision of the Constitutional Court it can be concluded that a specification of gra-
tuitous healthcare covered by the public health insurance (specification by e.g. indi-
cation or the amount of the payment) is only a condition for provision of gratuitous 
healthcare and that it is possible to request direct payments from the patients for 
healthcare provided beyond this specification of gratuitous healthcare.
There has been one more relevant decision of the Constitutional Court – 
decision from 20th June 2013, No. Pl. ÚS 36/11. In this case the Constitutional Court 
dealt with the topic of possibility to pay for above-standard healthcare. Healthcare 
should have been divided into “standard” healthcare covered by the public health 
insurance and into “above-standard” healthcare where the patient would have to 
pay the difference between the costs of standard and above-standard healthcare. 
The Constitutional Court stated in its decision that the difference between standard 
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and above-standard healthcare must not be in the suitability and effectiveness of a 
treatment. According to Czech legislation, the patients have a right to such health-
care which corresponds with the requirements of best practice and medicinal ethics 
(CZECH REPUBLIC, 2013). 
A possible conclusion for the Czech system might be that in case there is a 
restriction for coverage of treatments or medicinal products by the public health in-
surance based on objective needs of patients and requirements of best practice and 
medicinal ethics, then a use of such treatment or medicinal product outside the sco-
pe of these restrictions shall be understood as provision of healthcare not covered by 
the public health insurance. As was mentioned above, if it is the only possible treat-
ment, then it must be covered by the public health insurance. If it is only the patient 
who wants this particular treatment but there is another effective treatment covered 
by the public health insurance, then the patient must pay for his preferred alternati-
ve himself. The discussed restriction might be determined only by legislation.
To restrict a patient in getting coverage of provided (and beneficial for the 
patient’s health) healthcare by the public health insurance is only possible through 
legislation. This restriction shall then apply to all similar cases and the only possibi-
lity to breach these restrictions is if otherwise the patient would not get any health-
care. That means a limitation of the fundamental right to healthcare is only possible 
if it is set by legislation. On the other hand if it is unequivocally determined by the 
legislation, which healthcare provided to patients should be covered by the public 
health insurance, then it should not be considered to be against the law if the patient 
decides to choose a different, more expensive treatment and to pay the difference 
between the coverage by the public health insurance and the price of patient’s treat-
ment. The patient must be informed of this alternative.
This opinion – that the patient shall have the right to pay for potentially 
beneficial healthcare even if he is not entitled to coverage of this healthcare by the 
public health insurance – is based on the fact that it cannot be possible to restrict 
the possible healthcare only to solutions covered by the public health insurance. Pa-
tients who do not meet the criteria to get coverage from the public health insurance 
for a treatment better than the one which is covered, should have the right to choose 
such not covered treatment and pay for it. But they should pay only the difference 
between the price of the treatment covered by the public health insurance and the 
price of the chosen treatment. They should not be excluded from the public health 
insurance system and forced to pay the whole costs of their preferred alternative.
In this connection it should be also mentioned that the provision of health-
care services is a question of private law because healthcare services are provided 
according to Section 2636 and following of the Act No. 89/2012 Sb., civil code. It is up 
to the contractual parties which healthcare they agree on. However, then a problem 
arises whether this solution is also covered by the public health insurance according 
to Art. 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms or not. If there is no 
coverage by the public health insurance, it does not mean that it could or should 
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be possible to deny the patient his right arising out of the Art. 31 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms – i.e. the right to get healthcare covered by the 
public health insurance.
5 Conclusion
With a continuously increasing quality of healthcare, instruments and me-
dicinal products (which leads to an increase of costs), the life expectancy lengthens 
due to a better ability of the system to detect illnesses. On the other hand there is the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to healthcare (Art. 31 of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights and Freedoms).
Logically, there must be a limitation of this right because it is not possible to 
give everything necessary to all who need it. There must be an admissible limitation 
of this right which would be legal and legitimate at the same time. The article has 
shown that there are possibilities of the system to limit the constitutional right to 
healthcare. In the Czech Republic these possibilities are mainly based on limitation 
of payments from the public health insurance system and related legislation. This 
legislation determines to which extent and for which indication a particular treat-
ment or medical device will be covered by public health insurance system and then 
these rules apply to all patients. The question, how sustainable this system is for the 
future, remains open.
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HUMAN DIGNITY AND PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS1 
A DIGNIDADE HUMANA E A ANÁLISE DA PROPORCIONALIDADE
1 Absolute and Relative Conceptions of Human Dignity
The relation between proportionality analysis and human dignity is one of 
the most contested questions in the debate about the normative structure of human 
dignity. Two conceptions stand in opposition: an absolute and a relative conception. 
According to the absolute conception, the guarantee of human dignity counts as a 
norm that takes precedence over all other norms in all cases. Taking precedence over 
all other norms in all cases implies that balancing is precluded. This, in turn, means 
that each and every interference with human dignity is a violation of human digni-
ty. Thus, justified interference with human dignity becomes impossible. By contrast, 
proportionality analysis is intrinsically connected to the distinction between justified 
and unjustified interferences. A proportional interference is justified and is, therefore, 
constitutional. The opposite applies in the case of disproportional interference. The 
absolute conception is incompatible with this conceptual framework. For this reason, 
it is incompatible with proportionality analysis. According to the relative conception, 
precisely the opposite is true. The relative conception says that the question of whe-
ther human dignity is violated is a question of proportionality. With this, the relative 
conception is not only compatible with proportionality analysis, it presupposes it.
2 Practical Significance
The question of whether the absolute or the relative conception is right, 
one might well thing, is no more than a highly abstract theoretical question. Just the 
opposite, however, is the case. This can be illustrated by turning to the adjudication 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which is characterized by a number of 
inconsistencies. Sometimes the Court points in the direction of the absolute concep-
tion, sometimes it follows the relative line. An example of a decision with a strong 
absolute touch is the decision from 1973 on secret tape-recordings. The Court em-
phasizes that human dignity requires an “absolutely protected core area of private 
self-determination”,2 and determines the relationship between the concept of abso-
lute protection and the concept of balancing in the following way:
* Professor at Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Germany; alexy@law.uni-kiel.de
1  This article was first discussed at Autum 2014 Unoesc International Legal Seminar, in Chapecó, Santa Catarina 
State, Brazil.
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Even outweighing public interests cannot justify an infringement of the ab-
solutely protected core area of private self-determination; no balancing in accordan-
ce with the principle of proportionality takes place.3
In its opinion on the acoustic observation of accommodation, decided more 
than 30 years later, the Court confirmed this.4 Nevertheless, this claim strikes one as 
puzzling (ALEXY, 2002, p. 63). Is it to be understood that human dignity takes prece-
dence even in those cases where, from the perspective of constitutional law, a competing 
principle has greater weight? This would boil down to a contradiction. Having greater 
weight from the perspective of constitutional law implies precedence over whatever 
has lesser weight from the standpoint of constitutional law. In this interpretation, the 
claim quoted says that the colliding principle takes precedence and does not take pre-
cedence. To avoid this contradiction, the phrase “outweighing public interests” must 
be understood as referring to interests that outweigh from some perspective other 
than that of constitutional law, say, from a political perspective. But then the thesis of 
the absolutely protected core area would become superfluous. Reasons that have no 
constitutional status5 cannot outweigh reasons that have constitutional status.
On the level of self-characterization the absolute line dominates. As soon as 
one turns to the details, however, the relative side emerges more and more clearly. 
An example is the decision on life imprisonment from 1977. The Court states:
Human dignity is also not violated if the completion of the sentence is ren-
dered necessary by the continued danger represented by the prisoner and if on this 
basis early release is excluded. “[…] In cases where the danger represented by the 
criminal offender has to be determined, there is no need for further substantiation 
that the principle of proportionality has to be observed […]”6
This is a clear case of proportionality analysis. Human dignity is considered 
as a principle that collides with the principle of public security. The collision has to be 
resolved by giving adequate weight to both, that is to say, by balancing. This has been 
corroborated in an opinion concerned with preventive detention, decided in 2004.7
Many more examples could be adduced.8 Here only one further case shall be 
considered, a case that is perhaps the judicial opinion in the adjudication of the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court that connects human dignity with proportionality 
most closely. The case, decided in 1978, concerns the question of whether human 
dignity is violated when one’s hair and beard, which an accused allowed to grow 
ever since the time of his imprisonment, are altered under compulsion in order to 
confront him with witnesses who, if they had seen him earlier, would have seen him 
looking altogether different. The Court denies that there was a violation of human 
3 Ibid.
4 BVerfGE 109, 279 (313).
5  See ibid., 81.
6  BVerfGE 45, 187 (242).
7  BVerfGE 109, 133 (151).
8  See on them NilsTeifke (2011, p. 16-25) and Baldus (2011, p. 536-540).
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dignity with three arguments. The first is that the interference is of “relatively low 
intensity”.9 Such an assessment of the intensity of interference is the first step of 
proportionality analysis. The second argument says that the clearing up of criminal 
offences and the investigation of offenders is an “outweighing public interest”.10 With 
this, human dignity is balanced with public interest. The third argument concludes 
the justification of the interference by stating that its purpose had nothing to do 
with “humiliation”11 and that it was not connected with any other “aims that would 
have to be disapproved by law”.12 This implies that the question of whether human 
dignity is violated does not depend on the act performed as such. It depends on the 
reasons standing behind the act. Under other circumstances the interference might 
well be disproportional, and would therefore count as a violation of human dignity. 
This interplay of reasons and counter-reasons is the essence of proportionality.
Up to this point, nothing has been said other than to introduce briefly the distinc-
tion between the absolute and the relative conception or construction of human dignity 
and to demonstrate that the adjudication of the German Federal Constitutional Court is, 
with respect to this distinction, highly unsatisfactory. The question that arises is whether 
the absolute or the relative conception is correct. My thesis is that the relative construction 
is, indeed, the correct one but that there exist some features of human dignity that move 
in the direction of absoluteness. The basis of my argument is principles theory. Therefore, 
I shall begin with a presentation of some basic elements of principles theory.
3 Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory
3.1 Rules and Principles
The basis of principles theory is the norm-theoretic distinction between rules 
and principles (ALEXY, 2002, p. 47-48). Rules are norms that require something de-
terminate. They are definitive commands. Their form of application is subsumption. 
By contrast, principles are optimization requirements. As such, they demand “[…] that 
something be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual pos-
sibilities.” (ALEXY, 2002, p. 47). Rules aside, the legal possibilities are determined es-
sentially by opposing principles. For this reason, principles, each taken alone, always 
comprise merely prima facie requirements. The determination of the appropriate de-
gree of satisfaction of one principle relative to the requirements of other principles is 
brought about by means of balancing. Thus, balancing is the specific form of applica-
tion of principles. If the guarantee of human dignity were absolute, it would have to be 
9  BVerfGE 47, 239 (247).
10  BVerfGE 47, 239 (248).
11  BVerfGE 47, 239 (247).
12  BVerfGE 47, 239 (247-8).
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considered as a definitive command, that is, as a rule. As a relative guarantee it has the 
character of a principle, that is, of a norm that requires balancing.
3.2 Proportionality
The nature of principles as optimization requirements leads straightaway to 
a necessary connection between principles and proportionality analysis. The principle 
of proportionality, which in the last decades has received ever greater international 
recognition in both the practice and the theory of constitutional review,13 consists of 
three sub-principles: the principle of suitability, of necessity, and of proportionality in 
the narrower sense. All three sub-principles express the idea of optimization. For this 
reason, the nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality and vice-versa.
The principles of suitability and necessity refer to optimization relative to 
the factual possibilities. Optimization relative to the factual possibilities consists in 
avoiding avoidable costs.14 Costs, however, are unavoidable when principles collide. 
Balancing then becomes necessary. Balancing is the subject of the third sub-princi-
ple of the principle of proportionality, namely, the principle of proportionality in the 
narrower sense. This principle expresses what optimization relative to the legal pos-
sibilities means. It is identical with a rule that can be called “the law of balancing” 
(ALEXY, 2002, p. 222-224). It states:
The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, 
the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.
3.3 Weight Formula
Nearly everywhere in constitutional adjudication, the law of balancing is 
found in various different formulations. It expresses the essence of balancing and is 
of great practical importance. The analysis of complex problems of constitutional ri-
ghts, like that of human dignity, requires, however, a more precise and complete des-
cription of the structure of balancing. In order to achieve this, the law of balancing 
has to be elaborated further. The result of such a further elaboration is the weight 
formula (ALEXY, 2007, p. 25). It runs as follows:
Wi,j represents the concrete weight of the principle Pi relative to the colliding prin-
ciple Pj. The weight formula defines this concrete weight as the quotient of three factors 
standing, so to speak, on each side of balancing. Ii and Ij are of special importance. Ii stands 
13  See, for instance, Beatty (2004), Sweet and Mathews (2008, p. 72-164) and Barak (2012).
14  See on this Alexy (2010, p. 222-224).
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for the intensity of interference with Pi.  Ij represents the importance of satisfying the colli-
ding principle Pj.  Ij, too, can be understood as intensity of interference, that is, as the inten-
sity of interference with Pj through non-interference with Pi. Wi and Wj stand for the abstract 
weights of the colliding principles Pi and Pj. When the abstract weights are equal, which is 
the case in many collisions of constitutional rights, they cancel each other out, that is, they 
play no role. By contrast, the abstract weight of human dignity plays a pivotal role, for it is re-
gularly15 deemed to be greater than that of the colliding principle. This is one of the features 
of human dignity from which a certain tendency toward absoluteness stems. 
Ii and Ij, and also Wi and Wj, concern the substantive dimension of balancing. Ri 
and Rj have a completely different character. They refer to the reliability of the empirical 
and normative assumptions concerning, first and foremost, the question of how inten-
sive the interference with Pi is, and how intensive the interference with Pj would be if 
the interference with Pi were omitted. Over and above this, the reliability of empirical 
and normative assumptions can also relate to the classification of the abstract weights, 
that is, to Wi and Wj. The decisive point is that reliability is a factor that does not refer to 
the things – in our case the intensity of interference and the abstract weights. That is, it 
is not an ontic factor. Rather, it is a factor that refers to one’s knowledge of things. That 
is, it is an epistemic factor. The inclusion of this epistemic factor in the weight formula 
is required by a second law of balancing, the epistemic law of balancing, which runs as 
follows: The more heavily an interference in a constitutional right weights, the greater 
must be the certainty of its underlying premises (ALEXY, 2002, p. 418).
The concept of underlying premises used in this formulation comprises nor-
mative premises as well as empirical premises. Ri and Rj must therefore be unders-
tood as referring to normative premises as well as to empirical premises. This can be 
expressed by the following equation:
This equation might be called “reliability equation”. In cases in which both 
empirical and normative reliability are in question, Ri and Rj have to be substituted 
by the respective products on the right side of the reliability equation. In this way, a 
refined version of the weight formula16 enters the stage:
15  If one assumes that human dignity is the highest principle of law, its abstract weight is cancelled out only in col-
lisions in which human dignity stands on both sides. 
16  See on this Alexy (2015).
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Here only one point is of interest. In the debate over human dignity extreme 
or tragic collisions play an important role. Examples are torture in a ticking nuclear 
bomb scenario and downing an airplane full of passengers, that has been hijacked by 
terrorists who plan to use it as a weapon to kill as many persons as possible. Torture 
in the ticking bomb scenario concerns, without any doubt, human dignity. Accepting 
the death of the passengers is, obviously and profoundly, an interference with their 
right to life. Whether it is also an interference with their right to human dignity, as the 
German Federal Constitutional Court assumed, can remain open here. The decisive 
point is that in both cases the question of whether the interference is justified depends 
essentially on the reliability of numerous empirical assumptions BOROWSKI (2007, p. 
101-104), that is, on Rj
e. To give it expression in the words of the Court:
The uncertainties […] necessarily have effects on the prognosis of how long 
persons on board an airplane which has been transformed into an attack weapon 
still have to live, and whether there is still a chance of saving them. For this reason, 
it will normally not be possible to make a reliable judgment which says that the lives 
of these persons are ‘anyway already lost’.17
A formula like the weight formula, which expresses a quotient of two pro-
ducts, is sensible only if all of the factors can be represented by numbers. This is the 
problem of graduation. Elsewhere (ALEXY, 2002, p. 409-10, 419; ALEXY, 2007, p. 20-
26). I have proposed a discrete, that is, a non-continuous triadic scale, in which geo-
metric sequences are implemented. This scale assigns the values “light”, “moderate”, 
and “serious” to the intensity of interference and to the abstract weights. These values 
are expressed by the numbers 20, 21, and 22, that is, by 1, 2, and 4. Where the epistemic 
side is concerned, that is Ri and Rj, or, in the refined version of the weight formula, Ri
e 
and Ri
n as well as Rj
e and Rj
n, one can work with the stages “reliable” or “certain” (r), 
“plausible” (p), and “not evidently false” (e), to which the numbers 20, 2-1, and 2-2, that 
is, 1, , and , are to be assigned (ALEXY, 2007, p. 25). By means of these triads, most of 
the decisions of constitutional courts can be grasped. Where they do not suffice, that 
is, where one has to introduce a still more attenuated graduation, they can be exten-
ded to double-triadic scales (ALEXY, 2007, p. 22-23). A good deal more could be said 
about the weight formula. For a discussion of the relation between human dignity and 
proportionality, however, what has been said here ought to suffice.
4 The Concept of Human Dignity
4.1 Descriptive and Normative Elements
If the guarantee of human dignity can and should have the structure of a princi-
ple, then the relative construction is correct. Principles are optimization requirements. 
17  BVerfGE 115, 118 (158).
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The answer to the question of whether the guarantee of human dignity can have the 
structure of a principle, therefore, boils down to the question of whether human dignity 
is “something” that can “be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and 
factual possibilities” (ALEXY, 2002, p. 47). This, again, depends on what human dignity 
is, that is to say, it depends on the concept of human dignity. The concept of human dig-
nity is a highly complex concept that connects descriptive or empirical with evaluative 
or normative elements. The descriptive element most often mentioned is autonomy, and 
the most prominent formulation stems from Kant (1964, p. 103): “Autonomy is therefore 
the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” From the point 
of view of moral theory, Kant is right. From the point of view of legal theory, however, a 
broader empirical basis seems to be preferable, for the legal protection of human dig-
nity is not confined to the protection of autonomy in the sense of moral self-legislation. 
It includes, for instance, also the right to exist and the right to take choices of whatever 
kind (ALEXY, 2002, p. 324-325; ALEXY, 2005, p. 100-102). For this reason the concept 
of human dignity has to be connected with a broader descriptive basis. Such a broader 
descriptive or empirical basis is provided by the concept of person, which, as including 
autonomy, in Kant’s writings also plays a pivotal role (KANT, 1964, p. 96).
4.2 The “Double-Triadic” Concept of Person
My main thesis about the concept of person is that this concept has a dou-
ble-triadic structure (ALEXY, 2007, p. 94-100). In order to be a person, one has to ful-
fill three conditions twice around. The first condition of the first triad is intelligence, 
the second sentiment, and the third consciousness. Intelligence alone does not su-
ffice, for computers have, in a certain sense, intelligence, but they are, at least at the 
present stage of their development, not persons. The connection of intelligence and 
sentiment, too, is not enough. Animals can have, at least to a certain degree, intelli-
gence and sentiment, but they are not persons. For this reason, the third condition 
of the first triad, consciousness or, more precisely, self-consciousness, is the pivotal 
condition. Self-consciousness is defined by reflexivity. In order to determine what 
reflexivity is, three kinds of reflexivity have to be distinguished: cognitive, volitive, 
and normative reflexivity. This is to say that the third element of the concept of per-
son, self-consciousness, again comprises three elements. This is the reason why the 
concept of person, presented here, can be designated as “double-triadic”.
Cognitive reflexivity consists in making oneself the object of knowledge. One 
could also speak of “self-knowledge”. The most elementary piece of self-knowledge 
is knowledge of the fact that we have been born and that we will die. To be a person, 
cognitive reflexivity is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Volitive and normative refle-
xivity must be added. Volitive reflexivity consists in the ability to direct one’s beha-
vior and, with this, oneself by acts of will. As far as single acts are concerned, this is 
self-direction. With respect to the whole of life one can speak of “self-formation”. It is 
exactly this capacity of self-formation that Pico della Mirandola (1990, p. 6) considers 
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as the decisive reason for the dignity of human beings when he characterizes man as 
his “own […] creative sculptor” (“ipsius […] plastes et fictor”).
The result of self-formation can be good or bad. Pico talks about the possibili-
ties both of brutal degeneration (“brutadegenerare”) and of development into a higher 
dimension (“in superiora”) (PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, 1990, p. 6). This shows that 
volitive reflexivity as such does not yet include normativity. Normativity enters the stage 
with the third kind of reflexivity, normative reflexivity. Normative reflexivity is concer-
ned with self-assessment under the aspect of correctness. Here the question is of whe-
ther an action one has performed or wants to perform is right or wrong, and whether the 
life one leads or has led is, or was, a good life. This is the dimension of Kantian autonomy.
4.3 Human Dignity as A Bridge Concept
One who fulfills the conditions of, first, intelligence, second, sentiment, and, third, 
reflexivity in the form of cognitive, volitive, and normative reflexivity is a person. This is 
the descriptive side of human dignity. The step to the normative side begins with a con-
nection between the concept of person and the concept of human dignity. This connection 
can be expressed in the following way: All persons possess human dignity. This claim is 
true, but it does not render explicit the normative dimension of human dignity. This can 
either be done by connecting the concept of human dignity with the concept of value, as 
Ronald Dworkin does with his “principle of intrinsic value” (DWORKIN, 2006, p. 9), or by 
connecting the concept of human dignity with the concepts of duties and rights. In law, 
the latter seems to be preferable. The connection of human dignity with duties as well as 
rights can be expressed in two ways. The first is the duty-formulation. It says: 
• Human dignity requires that all human beings are taken seriously as 
persons.
The second is the right-formulation. It says: 
• All human beings have the right to be taken seriously as persons.
In the first formulation the concept of human dignity appears, in the second 
it does not. But it is easy to alter this. Human dignity can be deleted in the first for-
mulation by giving it the following form: 
• All human beings are to be taken seriously as persons. 
And human dignity can be inserted into the second formulation by trans-
forming it as follows: 
• Human dignity gives all human beings the right to be taken seriously as 
persons.
